

# COHERENCE AND PRIORITY: EVALUATING THE CONSISTENT ETHIC

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IN THE 1980'S THE "CONSISTENT ETHIC OF LIFE" emerged as a theoretical and practical movement within the Catholic community. Crystallized in a series of addresses by Joseph Cardinal Bernardin,<sup>i</sup> the consistent ethic offered a moral and political linkage among a variety of human life-issues: abortion, euthanasia, war, and capital punishment. This ethical position immediately provoked intellectual controversy. Supporters such as J. Bryan Hehir,<sup>ii</sup> Sidney Callahan,<sup>iii</sup> and Ronda Chervin<sup>iv</sup> touted the value of a comprehensive defense of human life across a spectrum of issues. Critics such as James Gustafson,<sup>v</sup> Richard McCormick,<sup>vi</sup> and John Finnis<sup>vii</sup> analyzed the defects of such a global ethic. In the practical arena, the consistent-ethic perspective animated such activist groups as Just Life and the Seamless Garment Network.<sup>viii</sup> In many pro-life circles, however, the ethic received a critical reception,<sup>ix</sup> inasmuch as it risked displacing the primacy of the abortion issue in a welter of secondary concerns.

Less than a generation after its emergence, the consistent ethic is already showing the signs of its age. One of the key contexts for its elaboration, the imminent danger of nuclear attack in the Cold War, is now of historical interest. One of the pressing contemporary threats to human life, euthanasia in the form of physician-assisted suicide, was scarcely an issue at its birth. Nonetheless, due to its ambitious scope and wide influence, the consistent ethic merits careful analysis.

## CORPUS

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critique of the consistent ethic as a tool to defend the right to life. The major object of this critique is Bernardin's collection of writings devoted to this topic. Bernardin's version of the consistent ethic is important both because of its influence and because of its theoretical sophistication. Bernardin provides the clearest outline of the consistent ethic in five addresses: Fordham (1983);<sup>x</sup> St. Louis (1984);<sup>xi</sup> Seattle (1986);<sup>xii</sup> Portland (1986);<sup>xiii</sup> Chicago (1987).<sup>xiv</sup>

Important applications of the consistent ethic emerge in addresses on abortion (Kansas City, 1985),<sup>xv</sup> pornography (Cincinnati, 1984),<sup>xvi</sup> poverty (Catholic University, 1985),<sup>xvii</sup> the death penalty (Chicago, 1985),<sup>xviii</sup> health care (Chicago, 1985;<sup>xix</sup> New York, 1986).<sup>xx</sup>

Throughout this canon, Bernardin sketches the tenets of this ethic on several distinctive levels. First, at the level of vision, the ethic provides an account of the dignity of human life and the attitude of respect which cherishes it. Second, at the level of moral principle, the ethic identifies certain negative and positive rules of action enjoined by this respect. Third, at the level of application, the ethic examines the linkage among various life-issues. Finally, at the political level, the ethic studies the translation of its vision and norms into specific public policies.

#### ANTHROPOLOGICAL VISION

At the level of vision, Bernardin insists upon the sacred and social nature of human life. “Catholic social teaching is based on two truths about the human person: human life is both sacred and social. Because we esteem human life as sacred, we have a duty to protect and foster it at all stages of development, from conception to natural death, and in all circumstances. Because we acknowledge that human life is also social, society must protect and foster it.”<sup>xxi</sup> The consistent ethic offers a comprehensive account of the sacredness of human life: it is imperative in each person from conception until death. It cannot be limited to the adult, the born, the conscious, or the healthy.

The consistent ethic also insists upon the social framework of this sacred life. Its defense and promotion at each stage of development is properly a concern of the entire community. It cannot be relegated to the voluntary concern of private individuals.

Especially in his later addresses, Bernardin stresses that this vision of the sacredness and sociability of life is a vision proper to human life alone. It is the personal nature of this life which merits such careful defense. “The theological assertion that the person is the *imago Dei*, the philosophical affirmation of the dignity of the person, and the political principle that society and state exist to serve the person—all these themes stand behind the consistent ethic.”<sup>xxii</sup> Against the criticism of James Gustafson<sup>xxiii</sup> that

the life of the individual person must be weighed against other social goods, Bernardin insists that “in moments of conflict between the individual and the social, the individual must predominate for it is here that the fullest presence of the Divine is to be encountered.”<sup>xxiv</sup> In other words, the consistent ethic’s vision of the sacredness and sociability of life is not a sacral vitalism. Its vision places the individual person, the irreplaceable image of God, at the center of its metaphysics, ethics, and political program.

#### ETHICAL NORM

At the level of moral principle, Bernardin underlines a key negative norm for human action: One may never directly kill an innocent human being. “The basic moral principle that the direct killing of the innocent is always wrong is so fundamental in Catholic theology that the need to defend it in the multiple cases of abortion, warfare, and the case of the handicapped and the terminally ill is self-evident.”<sup>xxv</sup> He underlines that “The inviolability of innocent human life is a fundamental norm.”<sup>xxvi</sup> In these passages, the central moral principle tied to respect for life is the categorical refusal to kill directly an innocent. It is adherence to this norm which simultaneously protects the child in the womb, the civilian in wartime, and the patient with Alzheimer’s.

Bernardin’s defense of the absoluteness of this norm is adamant. He explicitly refutes the position of Richard McCormick,<sup>xxvii</sup> a moral theologian who had argued that this rule can admit of rare exceptions. “I think that the reduction of the prohibition against the intentional killing of the innocent to a status less than an absolute rule is not correct.... Because of my experience with this specific moral dilemma of deterrence and because I find the prohibition against the intentional killing of the innocent a crucial element across the spectrum of the consistent ethic, I find myself not persuaded by Fr. McCormick’s recommendation.”<sup>xxviii</sup> For this version of the consistent ethic, the norm against direct homicide of the innocent is absolute.

In other passages, Bernardin provides norms for action far broader than that presented in the traditional rule against direct killing of the innocent. In several addresses, Bernardin summarizes the Catholic norm as a more

general repugnance toward all deliberate homicide. He presents “the traditional Catholic teaching that there should always be a *presumption* against taking human life, but in a limited world marked by the effects of sin there are some narrowly defined *exceptions* where life can be taken.”<sup>xxxix</sup>

Further, he argues that these permissible exceptions have been progressively narrowed by the magisterium. Two examples are the narrowing of “just war” causes to one (defense of the innocent) and the prudential judgment of recent popes and bishops that capital punishment, although theoretically legitimate, should be abandoned in favor of less violent means of punishment.<sup>xxx</sup> In his 1986 New York address, he further restricts the scope of these exceptions: “Life itself is of such importance that it is never to be attacked directly.”<sup>xxxix</sup> Without yielding to pacifism, such broad norms do suggest a heightened animus against all voluntary homicide and an erosion of the strict distinction between innocent and aggressive life which informed the traditional norm.

Not only does Bernardin underline the negative norms regarding homicidal action. He also sketches the positive duties which the conscientious person must exercise in the defense of human life. In numerous speeches, Bernardin ties concern for the right-to-life to concern for quality-of-life issues which promote and enhance human life. The 1986 New York address is typical. “I would like to examine...the relationship between ‘right to life’ and ‘quality of life’ issues. If one contends, as we do, that the right of every unborn child should be protected by civil law and supported by civil consensus, then our moral, political, and economic responsibilities do not stop at the moment of birth! We must defend that *right to life* of the weakest among us: we must also be supportive of the *quality of life* of the powerless among us: the old and the young, the hungry and the homeless, working mothers and single parents, the sick, the disabled, and the dying. The viability and the credibility of the ‘consistent ethic’ principle depends primarily upon the consistency of its application.”<sup>xxxii</sup> In this perspective, the positive duties to nurture the lives of the vulnerable emerge as correlative with the negative duties of avoiding unjustified homicide.

ANALOGY OF LIFE

At the third level of analysis, Bernardin specifies the linkage among a variety of human life-issues from the consistent-ethic perspective. In his later addresses, he cautions that such linkage requires careful analogical reasoning, that is, a prudent recognition of the discontinuities, as well as the similarities, between these various questions of life-endangerment and life-diminishment.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Nonetheless, the ethic tends to highlight the similarities, thus breaking the left/right opposition which tends to isolate particular life-issues according to narrow ideological interests.

The linchpin of this linkage is the key moral norm against the direct killing of the innocent. This norm guides human action across a wide spectrum of life-issues. “The more explicit connection is based on the principle which prohibits the directly intended taking of innocent human life. The principle is at the heart of Catholic teaching on abortion; it is because the fetus is judged to be both human and not an aggressor that Catholic teaching concludes that direct attack on fetal life is always wrong.... The same principle yields the most stringent, binding, and radical conclusion of the pastoral letter [on war and peace]: that directly intended attacks on civilian centers are always wrong.... The use of this principle exemplifies the meaning of a consistent ethic of life. The principle which structures both cases, war and abortion, needs to be upheld in both places.”<sup>xxxiv</sup> This norm illuminates the moral similarities among direct abortion, active euthanasia and counter-civilian warfare, without ignoring the ethical issues (such as the ordinary/extraordinary means distinction in euthanasia) which are proper to only one area of human life dilemmas.

In other passages, however, the linkage is far broader. Respect for life involves respect for the life of the aggressor, hence opposition to the death penalty. “We have also opposed the death penalty because we do not think its use cultivates an attitude of respect for life in society.”<sup>xxxv</sup> The defense of the right to life entails support for the quality of life of the vulnerable. “Those who defend the right to life of the weakest among us must be equally visible in support of the quality of life of the powerless among us: the old and the young, the hungry and the homeless, the undocumented immigrant and the unemployed worker.”<sup>xxxvi</sup> Opposition to direct homicide of the innocent should foster repugnance toward the homicide of the aggressor and positive support for the development of the lives of the most

fragile members of society.

Bernardin further extends this linkage to include what he terms “life-diminishing” as well as “life-threatening” activities. As examples of such life-diminishing issues, he lists “prostitution, pornography, sexism, and racism.”<sup>xxxvii</sup> Opposition to these evils is tied to opposition to direct killing of the innocent because such social evils radically diminish the value of the life of the persons affected by them. “The comprehensive moral vision, which the consistent ethic of life promotes, demands that we work together to eliminate the evils of obscenity, pornography, and indecency even as we address the other evils which threaten and diminish life in today’s society.”<sup>xxxviii</sup>

Bernardin does recognize that not all issues bear equal prominence in this analogy of life. “A consistent ethic of life does not equate the problem of taking life (*e.g.*, through abortion and in war) with the problem of promoting human dignity (through humane programs of nutrition, health care, and housing.)”<sup>xxxix</sup> Nonetheless, the general tenor of Bernardin’s analysis is to present the consistent ethic of life as a broad vision of strict opposition to direct homicide of the innocent, general repugnance to all deliberate homicide, and positive action to promote human life through social protection and combat against a wide variety of social ills. Individual and corporate witness on behalf of life which lacks such linkage would appear to lack consistency and credibility.

#### POLITICAL TRANSLATION

At the last level of analysis, Bernardin studies the translation of the ethic’s moral principles into public policy. Two attitudes mark this analysis. On the one hand, Bernardin insists that the integral respect of human life must manifest itself through a broad civic network of laws and institutions. He underscores the role of the Church as advocate and critic in the state’s construction of a life-respecting polity. On the other hand, the Cardinal recognizes that the moral and political orders are not coterminous. The finite resources of the state and the principle of subsidiarity place limits upon the power of the state to defend and promote life. Moreover, the pluralistic and individualistic cast of American society makes the translation of moral principle into civil law even more problematic.

In numerous passages, Bernardin indicates the breadth of the civic programs which flow from the respect of human life. The Seattle address presses a typical case. "If one contends, as we do, that the right of every fetus to be born should be protected by civil law and supported by social consensus, then our moral, political, and economic responsibilities do not stop at the moment of birth. Those who defend the right to life of the weakest among us must be equally visible in support of the quality of life of the powerless among us: the old and the young, the hungry and the homeless, the undocumented immigrant and the unemployed worker. Such a quality of life posture translates into specific political and economic positions on tax policy, employment generation, welfare policy, nutrition and feeding programs, and health care."<sup>xi</sup> The consistent respect of life expresses itself as advocacy both for laws which ban unjustified homicide (such as abortion) and for social-welfare programs which sustain the lives of the marginal.

In many addresses, Bernardin extends the defense of human life to concerns outside of the immediate area of homicide, such as pornography<sup>xii</sup> or the employment policies of hospitals.<sup>xiii</sup> He justifies the breadth of the interventions of the American bishops in both domestic and foreign policy as a faithful political translation of a consistent respect for life. "On issues as diverse as abortion, Central America, nuclear war, and poverty, failure of the bishops to speak would be a dereliction of civic responsibility and religious duty."<sup>xiii</sup> Effective promotion of life demands such comprehensive political witness.

Political, as well as moral, commitment to defend life requires consistency in its principles and applications. The issue of political consistency is especially acute in one's posture toward the extent of state authority in life-related questions. One cannot support a maximalist polity in one area, then suddenly tout a minimalist polity in another. "Consistency means we cannot have it both ways: We cannot urge a compassionate society and vigorous public policy to protect the rights of the unborn and then argue that compassionate and significant public programs on behalf of the needy undermine the moral fiber of society or are beyond the proper scope of governmental responsibility."<sup>xiv</sup> In this political consistency, the ethic defended by Bernardin rejects both the liberal refusal to oppose certain

types of homicide (abortion, euthanasia) under the rubric of privacy and the conservative refusal to oppose certain types of life-sustaining institutions (social welfare programs) by an appeal to economic freedom. The consistent-ethic perspective clearly endorses substantial state intervention both to repress all homicide of the innocent and to foster the security of the marginal.

Despite the effort to deduce political from moral commitments, Bernardin recognizes that the moral and political orders are not identical. Following the position taken by the American episcopate in their pastoral letter on war and peace,<sup>xlv</sup> he concedes that the public-policy conclusions which the bishops support as applications of moral principles do not enjoy the same authority as the principles themselves. Differences in analysis of empirical facts, in prudential judgment regarding feasibility, and in political philosophy can lead Church members, let alone the general public, to divergent positions on public-policy solutions. A realistic appreciation of the gap between the clarity of the moral order and the ambiguity of the political realm must govern debate on the translation of the consistent ethic's moral imperatives into a civic code.

Several factors limit the capacity of the state to defend and promote life. One is the radical difference in scope between the moral and the civic orders. "Although the premises of civil law are rooted in moral principles, the scope of law is more limited and its purpose is not the moralization of society. Moral principles govern personal and social human conduct and cover as well interior acts and motivation. Civil statutes govern public order; they address primarily external acts and values that are formally social."<sup>xlvi</sup> In order to support the passage of a law, it is not sufficient to show that the action which is the object of the law is destructive or supportive of human life. One must show that the action is central to the social order itself and that the legislation will not produce even worse consequences. In American society, it is further necessary to demonstrate why the proposed legal remedy to the life-endangering evil should override the usual presumption on behalf of individual freedom.

In evoking the limits of the state in developing a pro-life civic code, Bernardin also appeals to a traditional tenet of Catholic social doctrine: the principle of subsidiarity. According to this principle, the state should not

attempt to do what is proper for certain intermediate bodies (family, guild, church) to do. In the field of life-related actions, this principle indicates that certain of these actions, especially those of a more social-welfare nature, should be left primarily to the care of these intermediate bodies rather than to the direction and possible abuse by the bureaucratic state. “We cannot be consistent with Catholic tradition unless we accept the principle of subsidiarity. I fully support a pluralist social system in which the state is not the center of everything.”<sup>xlvii</sup> Private groups play a key role in promoting human life, one which should not be supplanted by the state. Nonetheless, Bernardin immediately cautions about the misuse of this principle. “I do not want the principle of subsidiarity used in a way which subverts Catholic teaching on the collective responsibility of society for its poor. I am not endorsing a concept of decentralization or federalism which absolves the government from fulfilling its responsibilities.”<sup>xlviii</sup> Despite his affirmation of the principle of subsidiarity as a brake upon state power, Bernardin clearly refuses to accept it as a tool to abolish or reduce the substantial social-welfare duties proper to the state.

#### CONTRIBUTIONS

More than a decade after its emergence, the strengths and weaknesses of the consistent ethic appear in bolder relief. If Bernardin’s version of the ethic provides a clear framework for pro-life activism, its ambiguities have not receded with age.

In the Bernardin account, the consistent ethic provides several theoretical resources for the moral and political defense of human life. First, the ethic details a vision of the pre-eminent value of life. Not only does it evoke the sacredness of life. It details the distinctive value of human life as a unique person made in God’s image. The spiritual powers of intellect and will, proper to the person alone, ground the defense of human life against aggression as a supreme moral obligation. Moreover, Bernardin repeatedly emphasizes the social, as well as the sacred, character of human life. The exercise of these personal powers—their careful gestation as well as their immunity from assault—requires careful legal protection and generous social tutelage. At the level of vision, the consistent ethic explicitates the global attitude of reverence toward the good of personal life which must

inform the debate over moral rules and civic code.

Second, the ethic affirms a cardinal moral rule which cuts across the spectrum of human life-issues: One may never directly kill an innocent human being. It is this norm which grounds complete opposition to direct abortion, active euthanasia, and the direct killing of civilians in warfare. Adherence to this rule in all questions regarding homicide is the touchstone of moral consistency. Such an emphasis upon precise norms saves Bernardin's ethic from remaining at the vague level of general sentiments. His defense of the absolute and exceptionless nature of such norms, against the "lesser of evils" position of proportionalists, provides a steely clarity to the consistent ethic's account of human action.

Third, the consistent ethic carefully welds right and duty together in the human life arena. Respect for life entails both defense of the right of the innocent to live, from conception until natural death (hence, right as immunity from aggression), and the duty to foster this life through personal and corporate acts of nurturance (hence, commitment to social welfare). Consistent moral action, as well as equitable political translation of this action, turns upon the balanced synthesis of these rights and duties.

Fourth, the ethic provides a sophisticated measure of political consistency. This consistency does not involve uniformity in adherence to the civic application of certain principles concerning human life. It requires coherence in one's fundamental posture toward the state. One cannot insist upon a maximal state in the repression of murder (for example, through state bans on abortion and euthanasia) and a minimal state in the area of social welfare. Conversely, one cannot endorse a massive welfare state to promote life while denying the state competence to outlaw abortion and euthanasia in the name of privacy. Both the typically liberal and conservative accounts of the state fall radically short of the fundamental coherence, a coherence at the level of polity, demanded by the consistent ethic in its account of political authority and mission.

#### LIMITATIONS

Despite its contributions, this ethic manifests several major weaknesses. A certain theoretical haziness blunts its political effectiveness.

First, Bernardin compromises the clarity of the rule against direct killing

of the innocent by arguing, in certain passages, against all deliberate acts of homicide. He rightly claims that the terrible power of modern warfare has narrowed the acceptable grounds for recourse to war. He also rightly notes that, while the state in principle has the right to execute criminals, a compelling prudential case can be made for the renunciation of this right. But such a heightened attention to the life of the aggressor should not abolish or diminish the decisive moral difference between the rights of the innocent and those of the aggressor, especially in situations of immediate life-endangerment. Unfortunately, certain vague formulae in the Cardinal's addresses, such as opposition to all direct homicide, suggest such a leveling. Not surprisingly, such broad strictures undercut the firmness of the traditional moral norm and foster a political program so vast that it risks impotence.

Second, the intertwining of the negative and positive duties concerning the good of life may suggest a certain equivalence regarding the two. As John Paul II argues in *Evangelium Vitae*,<sup>xlix</sup> however, the similarity between these two sets of duties is not exact. The negative duty to avoid murder, that is, the direct killing of the innocent, is absolute. It binds all without exception. The positive duties to foster life, however, have a looser scope and force. One may rightly choose among these obligations, such as the duty to feed the poor or to educate the ignorant. The precise nature of these obligations is often elusive, varying according to the resources of individuals and societies. While Bernardin does argue that all of these duties do not possess the same moral absoluteness, his constant interlacing of the negative duties against homicide with the positive duties toward social welfare tends to suggest a moral equivalence among them. The absoluteness of the duty to avoid murder (and the unique moral gravity of murder) tends to be effaced in a congeries of duties to perform the corporal works of mercy.

This tendency to level all life-related duties becomes especially problematic in the political arena. It is relatively easy to outline the state's duties to defend the right-to-life of the innocent. This entails a legal code which recognizes the right-to-life of each citizen from conception until natural death and a judicial framework for the prosecution of assaults against this fundamental right. While individuals may dispute the merits of

'imperfect' legislation in this field, the *telos* of the state in this regard is clear. But when the state ponders social welfare policies in this area, the proper outcome is inevitably hazier. People equally committed to the good of life may legitimately disagree on the desirability and details of particular laws concerning education or health. The principle of subsidiarity and the role of the intermediate bodies raise serious questions regarding the prerogatives and limits of the state in such life-enhancing areas. While Bernardin, especially in his later addresses, does recognize such ambiguities, he tends to minimize them in the name of the state's duties toward the common good. This political minimization of legitimate pluralism concerning the state's role in fostering social welfare reflects the problematic fusion of positive and negative duties toward human life on the level of moral obligation.

Third, the version of the consistent ethic supported by Bernardin appears to lack political prudence. The art of government is not the simple capacity of the legislator to turn moral desiderata into civil law. It is the power to prioritize. It is the ability to distinguish between grave and minor evils, more urgent and less urgent concerns in a given society. It is the prophetic discernment about which questions of justice demand immediate consideration and which, for the moment, may remain legitimately in the background. Since the late 1960's, especially since the *Roe v. Wade* decision (1973), the American bishops have placed such a priority upon the question of abortion. They have emphasized that the sudden disenfranchisement of an entire class of citizens and the legacy of 1.5 million abortions a year constitute a cataclysmic assault upon human rights.

In many recent documents the bishops have labeled abortion "the pre-eminent civil rights issue of our age." In Bernardin's version of the consistent ethic, however, abortion appears to lose its priority. Against the criticism of pro-life activists, Bernardin insists that a global concern for the value of life only heightens the case against abortion. In practice, however, the linkage of abortion to a myriad of other issues gravely weakens the primacy of the struggle against abortion. In the subordination of abortion to a long list of social welfare concerns, the scandal of the state's complicity in murder is effectively occulted. Such a political leveling of the abortion issue inevitably tends to justify the position of "pro-choice"

Catholics that their witness to life is found in other substantial patches of the seamless garment.

Finally, the very criterion for the development of this ethic—consistency—is a remarkably thin and formal one. It is a necessary but insufficient condition for developing an adequate ethic of life. Divergent moralities of life, perfectly consistent within themselves, can arrive at contradictory principles. The pure pacifist position, supported by thinkers such as the Mennonite John Yoder,<sup>1</sup> provides a coherent condemnation of all deliberate homicide by an appeal to the sacrificial love of one's enemy. In perfect internal coherence, it rules out all voluntary recourse to abortion, euthanasia, war, or lethal police action. The neo-libertarian position, defended by the philosopher Ronald Dworkin,<sup>ii</sup> exhibits a similar, if diametrically opposed, consistency. According to this perspective, the right-to-life is proper only to the self-conscious human being. Adult autonomy and self-determination are the key goods for state protection. In this schema, abortion and euthanasia are easily tolerated, while recourse to war may be justified.

In order to elaborate an adequate ethic of life, consistency alone does not suffice. To justify Bernardin's version of the consistent ethic, it is necessary to address the more substantive issues of why human life enjoys such pre-eminent value, of why the direct killing of the innocent is an absolute norm, and of why the state must firmly oppose every instance of such a gravely unjust act. Emphasizing too strongly the value of consistency in human life ethics may lead the Church to comfort a moral pluralism and a libertarian polity which it must contest.

#### NOTES

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i. Cf. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, *Consistent Ethic of Life* (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1988). This volume assembles the major speeches of Bernardin on the consistent ethic and the scholarly responses to his position presented at a colloquium at Loyola University of Chicago on November 7, 1987. Hereafter cited as CEL.

- ii. Cf. J. Bryan Hehir in CEL 218-36.
- iii. Cf. Sidney Callahan in CEL 237-44.
- iv. Cf. Ronda Chervin, *The Consistent Life Ethic: Understanding the Issues* (Ligouri: Ligouri Press, 1990).
- v. Cf. James Gustafson in CEL 210-17.
- vi. Cf. Richard McCormick in CEL 96-122.
- vii. John Finnis in CEL 182-95.
- viii. For a journal devoted to news and analysis of such consistent-ethic activism, cf. *Harmony* (P.O. Box 210056; San Francisco, CA 94121-0056).
- ix. Cf. the publications of the American Life League during the 1983-88 period for a selection of essays criticizing the consistent-ethic approach as subversive of work against abortion and erosive of the distinction between innocent and aggressive life.
- x. Cf. CEL 1-11.
- xi. Cf. CEL 12-19.
- xii. Cf. CEL 77-85.
- xiii. Cf. CEL 86-95.
- xiv. Cf. CEL 245-56.
- xv. Cf. CEL 20-26.
- xvi. Cf. CEL 27-35.
- xvii. Cf. CEL 36-48.
- xviii. Cf. CEL 59-65.
- xix. Cf. CEL 49-58.
- xx. Cf. CEL 66-76.
- xxi. CEL 88.
- xxii. CEL 79.

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xxiii. Cf. James Gustafson in CEL 196-209.

xxiv. CEL 250.

xxv. CEL 23.

xxvi. CEL 23.

xxvii. Cf. Richard McCormick in CEL 96-122.

xxviii. CEL 81.

xxix. CEL 5.

xxx. Cf. CEL 5-6.

xxxi. CEL 70.

xxxii. CEL 70.

xxxiii. Cf. CEL 80-83.

xxxiv. CEL 8.

xxxv. CEL 7.

xxxvi. CEL 7.

xxxvii. CEL 30.

xxxviii. CEL 34.

xxxix. CEL 15.

xl. CEL 82.

xli. Cf. CEL 27-35.

xlii. Cf. CEL 66-75.

xliii. CEL 43.

xliv. CEL 82.

xlv. Cf. CEL 43.

xlvi. CEL 92.

xlvii. CEL 42.

xlviii. CEL 42.

xlix. John Paul II, *Evangelium Vitae* #57.

l. Cf. John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972).

li. Ronald Dworkin, *Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1993).