CLONING

Chairman Bilirakis and Members of the Sub-Committee, I appreciate the invitation to testify before you today on the profound and critically important issue of human cloning, and am grateful that you are so diligently addressing and pursuing the correct information necessary upon which to ground a clear and defensible public policy in this area.

I would like to emphasize that what I have to say today is not simply a matter of my own opinion; nor is it a religious or theological position, nor grounded on any "faith" or "belief" system. On the contrary, it is based directly on fully referenced, objectively known scientific facts - scientific facts which any one can ascertain simply by going to their local library. (I have submitted xeroxed copies from many highly reputable human embryology text books to support my references.)

Many of us have been thoroughly convinced by the bioethics literature for many years now that the product of fertilization (or cloning) is not a human embryo, a human being, or a human person. However, when a human embryo or human being begins is strictly a scientific question, and should be determined by scientists. When a human person begins is a philosophical question.

Elaborate scientific arguments have been flooding the bioethics literature for some years now, positing such unscientific claims as: (1) normal pregnancy begins at implantation; (2) the human embryo is just a "blob" or piece of the mother's tissues; (3) that all of the genetic information specific for a human being is not present at fertilization, and that human embryos can give rise to teratomas or hydatidiform moles, and therefore are not even "human"; (4) that all of the cells from the outer trophoblast layer of the 5-6 day blastocyst are discarded after birth, and only the cells from the inner embryoblast layer become the adult; that totipotent cells can each develop into later individual human beings; and that twinning cannot take place after 14-days - and therefore the early human embryo/human being is not an "individual" yet, and therefore not a human "person" yet - and therefore it is really only a potential human embryo or potential human being, or a "pre-embryo"; (5) that full differentiation is only completed by 14 days; and that (6) true "personhood" is not present until "brain birth", i.e., the formation of the primitive streak, nerve-net, neocortex or whole brain integrating system.

Unfortunately, these "scientific facts" in the bioethics literature are all scientifically incorrect, and are precisely those currently used by those who want to argue that the product of cloning is just a potential human being, and therefore could be used in destructive experimental research to find cures for human diseases, etc. To determine scientifically if the human embryo produced immediately at fertilization or cloning is an already existing human being, all one has to do is count the number of chromosomes under a microscope, and observe the functions and activities immediately detectable (since, as scientists know, a thing acts or functions according to what it is). The correct scientific facts are the following.

The early human embryo is not a "blob" or piece of tissue of the mother. Normal pregnancy begins at fertilization; when the 23 chromosomes of the sperm and the 23 chromosomes of the ovum are combined at fertilization, a new, unique, living, individual, already existing human being with 46 chromosomes is formed (the number and quality specific for the human species). Although this means that the human embryo thus formed is a human being, the chromosomal make-up of the human embryo is qualitatively different from that of either the mother or the father. That is, the human embryo is genetically different from the tissues of the mother. Even in cloning, the resulting human embryo would not be absolutely genetically identical to the mother "donor". The single-cell embryo is already genetically a male or a female (or, in the case of cloning, a female); immediately specifically human enzymes and proteins are formed; specifically human tissues and organs will be formed. Virtually all of the genetic information the human being will ever have or need is present immediately at fertilization, or cloning. No genetic information is gained or lost throughout development - only the use of some information is lost through mechanisms such as methylation. This original genetic information in the single-cell human embryo then "cascades" throughout the course of human development, itself determining later human molecular information, tissue and organ formation (precisely why a skin cell is so different from a human embryo); and it does include the genetic information needed for differentiation, totipotency, and all of the processes of embryogenesis. Entities such as teratomas and hydatidiform moles do not arise from genetically normal human embryos to begin with, but from abnormal embryos (e.g., dispermy). Not all of the cells from the trophoblast layer are discarded after birth, but many from the yolk sac and allantois are incorporated into the embryo-proper as the early blood cells and the primordium of the primitive gut, and in the human adult as the median umbilical ligament and blood cells. Twinning is possible after 14-days, e.g., with fetus-in-fetu and Siamese twins. And there is no scientific physiological basis for a valid parallel between "brain death" and "brain birth", sentience or self-consciousness. Full human development, full brain integration and the actual exercising of what bioethicists call "rational attributes" or "sentience" are actually not complete until young adulthood.

"When does a human person begin", on the other hand, is a philosophical question. Only philosophical realism starts with and matches the correct scientific facts, necessarily concluding that personhood begins when the human being begins - at fertilization or cloning. If bioethics philosophical rationalism (e.g., the exercising of "rational attributes") or bioethics philosophical empiricism (e.g., the exercising of "sentience", or pain and pleasure) are the rationales for personhood, then newborns, young children, the comatose, Alzheimers and Parkinsons patients, alcoholics, drug addicts, the mentally ill and retarded, the depressed, paraplegics (e.g., Christopher Reeves) - and many of us - are not "persons" either, and thus, by the same logic, could be experimented on or so "disposed of". Arguments to that effect have already permeated the bioethics literature for many years now.

Public policy, I would think, should be based on accurate science. Scientifically we know that the immediate product of human cloning is an already existing, unique, individual, human being - the single cell human embryo - regardless of whether it is implanted or not. It is not a potential or possible human being or human embryo, nor is it a "pre-embryo; nor is it a drug. These are the correct scientific facts. Thus human cloning research essentially involves destructive human embryo research. Since research using and commercialization of human cloning uses human beings solely as illegitimate means to some one else's ends (no matter how lofty those ends), necessarily harming and destroying them, such research and commercialization is unethical, and should be totally banned.

Chairman Bilirakis and Members of the Sub-Committee on Health and Environment, I appreciate the invitation to testify before you today on the profound and critically important issue of human cloning, and am grateful that you are so diligently addressing and pursuing the information necessary upon which to ground a clear and defensible public policy in this area.

I would like to emphasize that what I have to say today is not simply a matter of my own opinion; nor is it a religious or theological position, nor grounded on any "faith" or "belief" system. To the contrary, it is directly based on fully referenced, objectively known scientific facts - scientific facts which any one can ascertain simply by going to their local library.

The bottom-line question concerning human cloning - not just by means of nuclear transfer, but by any other technique of cloning as well - is, "What is the immediate product of human cloning"? If the product of human cloning is a tomato, a head of lettuce, a frog or a giraffe, then our concerns about using that product for destructive experimental research or for commercial purposes would be quite different than if the product of human cloning is a human being. And simply because we can do something technically does not thereby make it ethical to actually do it. Utilitarian ethics would argue that great advances could be made to cure diseases, to increase our scientific knowledge or to reap great fortunes in the commercial market place. But even goals agreed to be truly beneficent and genuinely good are simply not sufficient in the determination of what is ethical research. The means used to reach those beneficent goals must be ethical as well. If the means used involve the harm and destruction of human beings, or the denigration of their inherent human dignity, then such research and commercialization would be unethical.

A point of clarity first. The question as to when a human embryo, or human being, begins, is strictly a scientific question, and should not be relegated to bioethicists, philosophers, theologians, governmental agencies or politicians. The answer to this question is simple. There is unquestionably a scientific consensus that the life of every single individual human being begins at fertilization as a single-cell human embryo (the zygote). I have included in my written testimony scores of scientific footnotes and references, from many different, highly acclaimed and the most commonly used human embryology text books, and have included the xeroxed pages from a number of these text books with my written testimony to demonstrate this scientific fact. What is true of the product of fertilization is true of the product of human cloning.

The question as to when a human person begins is a philosophical question. I have included for the record several of my articles discussing this at length, demonstrating that 'personhood' must begin when the human being begins - at fertilization (or, cloning). I will only refer briefly to the personhood (or philosophical) issue at the end of my testimony.

Many people (including members of Congress) have been thoroughly confused by the bioethics literature that the product of fertilization - or in this case, the product of human cloning - is not a human embryo, a human being, or a human person.[ii] Elaborate scientific arguments have been flooding the bioethics literature for some years now, positing such unscientific claims as the following.

It is argued that fertilization (or, likewise, cloning) is not the beginning of a human embryo or of a human being; it is just a "blob" or piece of the mother's tissues. At most what is there is only a "potential" or a "possible" human being. Fr. Bedate and Dr. Cefalo agree, claiming that all of the genetic information specific for a human being is not present at fertilization, and that human embryos can give rise to teratomas or hydatidiform moles, and therefore are not even "human" at all[iii].

Many have argued that fertilization (or cloning) may be the beginning of a human being, but not the beginning of a human person (a philosophical or theological claim grounded on incorrect science). They literally invented a new term called the "pre-embryo" to designate the product of fertilization (and now, cloning) from fertilization to implantation (5-6 days) or the formation of the primitive streak (14-days). What is present during this early period is only a "potential" or a "possible" human person or individual - and "individuality" is required, they say, before there can be personhood. For example, Dr. Clifford Grobstein (who is an amphibian embryologist, and not a human embryologist) and Fr. Richard McCormick, S.J. (a theologian), make the "scientific" claim that a genetically human being is present at fertilization, but it is not a human individual as yet (because it could still become more than one individual), and therefore not a human person as yet - it is just a "pre-embryo". To support this scientific myth they make the following "scientific" claims. To begin its growth, the human pre-embryo divides exponentially (i.e., 1, 2, 4, 16, 32, etc.). All of the outer trophoblast cells from the 5-6 day blastocyst are discarded after birth; only the cells from the inner embryoblast layer become the future adult. Therefore, the 5-6 day blastocyst is really a "pre-embryo", not an embryo (which doesn't begin, they say, until about 14-days, or the formation of the primitive streak - others argue similarly for about 3 weeks after fertilization). Further, these early totipotent cells are only a "loose collection of cells", and "have not decided yet how many individuals they will be". And most influential, they claim that twinning cannot take place after 14-days, so 14-days must be the beginning of a human individual, and therefore, of a human person. The early human "pre-embryo", then, is not a true human embryo or a human "individual", and therefore not a true human person yet[iv].

This is precisely the "science", by the way, which the N.I.H. Human Embryo Research Panel referenced in their Report to ground their conclusion that the "pre-embryo", or "pre-implantation embryo" (a legitimate term they use to mean the same as the "pre-embryo"), has a "reduced" moral status - and therefore it can be used in destructive experimental research. (It is interesting that there was not even one single human embryologist present on that N.I.H. Panel[v]). This is also precisely the "science" currently being used in the cloning debates in Congress to argue that the product of cloning is only a potential human embryo or human being, and therefore can be used in destructive experimentation to find cures for human diseases, etc.

The Australian theologian, Fr. Norman Ford, who wrote the book, When Did I Begin?, so influential in bioethics and currently used as a scientific resource in the American pharmaceutical industry, agrees with the scientific claims of Fr. McCormick and Dr. Grobstein, adding to their "science" his own claim that full differentiation is not even completed until 14 days[vi]. Finally, some, e.g., MacKay, Rahner, Ruff, Haring, Hans-Martin Sass, Singer and Wells - most of whom are philosophers or theologians - argue that true "personhood" is not present until "brain-birth", i.e., the formation of the primitive streak, the nerve-net, the neocortex or the whole brain integrating system[vii].

On the contrary, a human embryo or a human being begins at fertilization (or cloning). This human being, who is a single-cell human embryo or zygote, is not a "potential" or "possible" human being, but is an already existing human embryo, which is an already existing human being - with the "potential" or "possibility" to simply grow and develop bigger and bigger. Scientifically, there is no change in what it is, or its nature, once the single-cell human embryo or human being is formed. One can easily verify that scientifically as well (and therefore all arguments for delayed personhood are scientifically negated).

The correct scientific facts about which there is a scientific consensus are the following. Human life is biologically a continuum which has not halted or been interrupted for thousands of years. Although this continuum may be seen by some to be just a "process", it must be pointed out that there must be something there which is undergoing the "process". For example, "childhood" is a "process", yet no one would seriously argue that there is no child present which is undergoing that process. Similarly, fertilization (or cloning) is a process; but there is something which is undergoing that process. A human sperm or ovum, a kidney cell, or a liver, may be said to have human "life", but the real issue is that they are not human beings, capable themselves of directing and sustaining the continuum of human life. One could implant any of these in a uterus and they would simply rot. Only human beings can direct and sustain the continuum of human life and transmit it. Once a skin cell has been used in cloning, a change in natures has taken place. That is, it is no longer a skin cell; it has been changed into a human being. It no longer acts or functions as a skin cell; it now acts and functions as a human being (we know this scientifically). This is precisely the difference between a skin cell and the product of human cloning.

To scientifically determine if the immediate product of fertilization or cloning is a human embryo or a human being, all one has to do is count the number of chromosomes under a microscope, and particularly observe the functions and activities which are present immediately at fertilization or cloning (since scientists know that a thing acts or functions according to what it is). Fertilization or cloning does not produce a "blob" or piece of tissue of the mother, or a "drug". In fertilization, when the 23 chromosomes of the sperm and the 23 chromosomes of the ovum are combined, a new, genetically unique, living, individual, already existing single-cell human embryo or human being (the single-cell human zygote) with 46 chromosomes (the number and quality specific for the human species)[viii] is formed, and this human being has the capacity itself to direct all of its further growth and development. Although this means that the human embryo is an already existing human being, the chromosomal make-up of the single-cell human embryo is qualitatively different from that of either the mother or the father. That is, the genetic identity of the human embryo is different from the genetic identity of the tissues of the mother. The same would be true of the product of cloning, as the genetic make-up of the new human embryo, although an already existing human being, would be qualitatively different from the genetic make-up of the donor "mother" (due, e.g., to crossing-over of the maternal chromosomes during mitosis and cell division, environmental conditions, mutations, etc.). In fertilization, the single-cell human embryo formed at fertilization is already genetically a male or a female; in cloning, it would already be genetically a female.[ix] In beginning its growth, the human embryo divides asynchronously (i.e., 1, 2, 3, etc.).[x]

Immediately specifically human enzymes and proteins are formed (not tomato, lettuce or giraffe proteins and enzymes). Specifically human tissues and organs are formed (tomato, lettuce or giraffe tissues or organs are not formed - that is a scientific fact).[xi] Virtually all of the genetic information this human being will ever have or need is present immediately at fertilization or cloning. No new genetic information is gained or lost throughout development - only the use of some information is lost through mechanisms such as methylation.[xii] This original genetic information "cascades" throughout the course of human development, determining later molecular information, tissue and organ formation;[xiii] and it includes the genetic information needed for differentiation,[xiv] totipotency (in which the cells are already expressing differentiation)[xv] and all of the processes of human embryogenesis - sometimes even twinning. Entities such as teratomas and hydatidiform moles do not arise from genetically normal human embryos, but from abnormal embryos to begin with (e.g., dispermy).[xvi]

Further, the "pre-embryo" is a scientific myth. Scientifically we know that all of the cells from the trophoblast layer are not all discarded after birth, but many from the yolk sac and allantois are incorporated into the embryo-proper as the early blood cells and the primordium of the primitive gut, and in the human adult as the median umbilical ligament and blood cells.[xvii] Twinning is possible after 14-days and the formation of the primitive streak -indeed, months after fertilization - e.g., with fetus-in-fetu twins and with Siamese or con-joined twins.[xviii]

The term "pre-embryo" has a very interesting history, but has now been rejected by all human embryologists, including the internationally renowned human embryologist, Ronan O'Rahilly, who himself literally developed the internationally recognized Carnegie Stages of human embryological development. O'Rahilly has published that the term "pre-embryo" is "scientifically inaccurate" and erroneous, and states in his own human embryology text book that he refuses to use the term.[xix] The N.I.H Panel - whose conclusions, and the grounding for those conclusions, received unusually harsh responses and reviews even within bioethics itself - gave up using the term (but retained the use of the term "pre-implantation" embryo to mean the same as the term "pre-embryo").[xx]

The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist (A.C.O.G.), who along with several others have marketed the term "pre-embryo" for many years, has recently and reluctantly decided to go back to the scientifically accurate term "embryo" for the immediate product of fertilization (or cloning). A.C.O.G. also reluctantly agreed to drop its drive to define the "beginning of pregnancy" as implantation, after quite a scientific outcry from within its own membership as well as from colleagues outside of the organization. "Pregnancy" is correctly defined scientifically as beginning at fertilization.[xxi] Unfortunately, N.I.H.'s federal OPRR regulations[xxii] and Common Rule, which regulate the use of human subjects in research, still (in several revisions since 1981) contain the scientifically incorrect definitions of "pregnancy" as beginning at implantation (5-6 days after fertilization), and of "fetus" as also beginning at implantation (the fetal period actually does not begin until the ninth week after fertilization[xxiii]). Keith Moore, also not a human embryologist, but often quoted by McCormick, Grobstein and others, has agreed in writing that the term "pre-embryo", which he had just used for the first time in the 5th edition of his human development text book, was scientifically incorrect, and that he would have it removed in the next printings.[xxiv] Even Clifford Grobstein admitted to a scientific audience that he was using frog embryology and just calling it human embryology.[xxv]

And finally, there is no scientific physiological basis for a valid parallel between "brain death" and "brain birth", "sentience" or self-consciousness.[xxvi] Full human development, especially brain and nervous system development, and full brain integration,[xxvii] and the actual exercising of what bioethicists call "rational attributes" and "sentience" are not complete until young adulthood.[xxviii]

In sum, the answer to the first question, the scientific question, is simple and clear: the life of every human embryo and human being begins immediately at fertilization, or at cloning. Indeed, human cloning is essentially human embryo research. Thus cloning would be one ingenious way in which to by-pass or circumvent the current Congressional ban on human embryo research. The human embryo at fertilization or cloning is immediately an already existing, new, unique, individual human being - termed by scientists the single-cell human zygote. This is a scientific fact. And this is the way human beings are suppose to look at this stage of development. This is not a religious, theological or philosophical issue, nor a matter of any one's belief system or opinion. Any one - scientist or otherwise - who claims that this is not true or accurate, is scientifically wrong, and should be required to give extensive scientific proofs based only on the work of nationally and internationally recognized human embryologists - especially if such critically important public policy is to be explicitly based on it.

It would seem to me that public policy should only be based on the correct scientific facts. I would conclude, therefore, on scientific grounds alone, that the cloning or commercialization of any human beings should be banned - both publicly and privately - since human cloning and its commercialization necessarily and immediately produces human beings (which remain human beings whether implanted or not), and is essentially human embryo research. Human cloning and commercialization must by definition be unethical since the means used result in harm to and destruction of untold numbers of innocent human beings - human beings used solely as objects for some one else's goals - no matter how lofty those goals may be. Technology would then surely be master of man, rather than man master of technology.

The last question is, "when does a human person begin?"[xxix] As with public policy, any philosophical analysis of personhood must begin with and be based on the correct scientific facts. This is required for philosophical realism. Further, a thing acts or functions according to the kind of nature it has - or what it is. If a "human being" is a "rational animal"; if the term "rational" must include virtually the vegetative and sensitive powers; if all of its powers must be present together simultaneously with the body, with no splits - then personhood must begin when the human being begins - at fertilization (or cloning) - when the "matter" is already "appropriately organized". This actually matches the correct science: immediately at fertilization or cloning, specifically human enzymes and proteins are produced, and specifically human tissues and organs are continuously developed from fertilization or cloning on. Personhood, then, should be based on what something is, not on how one actually thinks or feels (merely functional definitions of a human person).

Yet other philosophical answers have been offered - based essentially on functionalism and on bioethics' rendition of philosophical rationalism or empiricism.[xxx] The question must be, do those arguments for "delayed" personhood square with or match the correct scientific facts; are they based on historically correct philosophical claims, or even philosophical claims which are theoretically or practically defensible, or logically valid and sound? Where does this bioethics logic take us? I and many others have demonstrated that these arguments have consistently and extensively used incorrect science, do not match the correct scientific facts, and are often historically inaccurate and philosophically indefensible (e.g., contain a mind/body split). In fact, none of the conclusions of these arguments even follow logically from their major and minor premises. It would seem that philosophical, theological or purely political presuppositions have been imposed on the scientific data. And if the true scientific data does not match, then it is simply changed accordingly.

Of equal concern is where we would end up as a society if that bioethics logic is pushed. If either "sentience" (the ability to feel pain and pleasure) or "rational attributes" (willing, choosing, loving, self-consciousness, the ability to relate to the world around us, etc.) are the rationale for human "personhood", then newborns, young children, Alzheimers and Parkinson patients, alcoholics, drug addicts, street people, runaways, the mentally ill and retarded, the depressed, the frail elderly, comatose patients, paraplegics and other patients with paralysis, patients in a persistent vegetative state - perhaps even teen-agers or politicians - (to name but a few) are not "persons" either, and thus, by the same logic, could be "disposed of" or experimented on at will. Indeed, the Australian philosopher Peter Singer (whose book, oddly enough, was the only reference used to ground the N.I.H. Human Embryo Research Panel's scientific charts) has used such arguments to justify the infanticide of normal healthy infants (because they do not exercise high levels of "rational attributes" or "sentience" - yet the higher primates, e.g., pigs, dogs, gorillas, etc., do, says Singer, and therefore he claims these animals are "persons").[xxxi] Philosopher Richard Frey,[xxxii] correctly following Singer's logic, has published that many adult human beings on the above list are not persons because they do not actively exercise "rational attributes" or "sentience"; therefore they should be substituted for the higher primates, e.g., dogs, pigs, gorillas, etc. - who are persons - in destructive experimental research. Norman Fost has argued that anencephalic newborns are "brain dead", and therefore we could take their organs for transplantation while they are alive. He has also argued that the "cognitively impaired" are "brain dead" (and one wonders if that means that their organs can be taken while alive as well). And so the logic goes.

Not only scientists, but also philosophers, theologians and bioethicists must be held to the same degree of accountability for their "expertise", especially when their "theories" on personhood would in any way be used to ground public policy. My guess is that they could never withstand such Congressional scrutiny. Thank you.

[i]. Because I had only 24 hours notice to write this testimony, I have edited the original summary and written testimony for style, clarity, and the addition of more references. Original copies may be obtained from the Committee: Alan Hill, Legislative Clerk for the Committee on Commerce, 2125 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C, 20515; 202-225-1919.

[ii]. But see D.N. Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human Embryo, (400-page Doctoral dissertation, in Philosophy) (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1991); W.C. Kischer and D.N. Irving, The Human Development Hoax: Time to Tell The Truth! (Clinton Township, MI: Gold Leaf Press, 1995; 2nd ed., 1997, by authors, ALL, distributor) (containing extensive references). In addition to the writers I have referenced infra, for a non-exhaustive list of other articles and writers who basically argue similarly, see (arranged in "rough" categories): Science: D.N. Irving, "Embryo research: A call for closer scrutiny", Linacre Quarterly (July 17, 1994); D.N. Irving, "Scientific and philosophical expertise: an evaluation of the arguments on fetal personhood", Linacre Quarterly (Feb. 1993), 60(1):18-46; D.N. Irving, "The impact of scientific misinformation on other fields: philosophy, theology, biomedical ethics, public policy", Accountability in Research (Feb. 1993), 2(4):243-272; D. Irving, "New Age embryology text books: Implications for fetal research", Linacre Quarterly (1994), 61:42-62; C. Ward Kischer, "In defense of human development", Linacre Quarterly (1992), 59:68-75; Kischer, "Human development and reconsideration of ensoulment", Linacre Quarterly (1993), 60:57-63; Kischer, "A new wave dialectic: The reinvention of human embryology", Linacre Quarterly (1994), 61:66-81; Kischer, "A commentary on the beginning of life: A view from human embryology", Linacre Quarterly (1996), 63:78-88; Kischer, "The big lie in human embryology: The case of the preembryo", Linacre Quarterly (in press); J. Carberry, D.W. Kmiec, "Abortion: How law denies science", Human Life Review (1992), 18:4:105; A. Fisher, "Individuogenesis and a recent book by Fr. Norman Ford", Anthropotes (1991), 2:199; P. McCullagh, The Foetus as Transplant Donor: Scientific, Social and Ethical Perspectives (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987); E.F. Diamond, "Abortion? NO!", Insight (Feb. 1972), 36-41. Philosophy: W. Quinn, "Abortion: identity and loss", Philosophy and Public Affairs (1984), 13:24-54; B. Brody, "On the humanity of the fetus", in Tom Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters, (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (California: Wadsworth, 1978), 229-240; R. Werner, "Abortion: The moral status of the unknown", in Social Theory and Practice (1974), 3:202; R. Wertheimer, "Understanding the abortion argument", Philosophy and Public Affairs (1971), 1:67-95. Science/Philosophy: D. Irving, "Which ethics for science and public policy?", Accountability in Research (1993), 3:77-100; D. Irving, "Quality assurance auditors: How to survive between a rock and a hard place", Quality Assurance: Good Practice, Regulation, and Law (1994), 3(1):33-52; Laura Palazzani, "The nature of the human embryo: Philosophical perspectives", Ethics and Medicine (1996), 12(1):14-17; Antonio Puca, "Ten years on from the Warnock Report: Is the human embryo a 'person'?', Linacre Quarterly (May 1995), 62(2):75-87; Agneta Sutton, "Ten years after the Warnock Report: Is the human neo-conceptus a person?", Linacre Quarterly (May 1995), 62(2):63-74; A. Zimmerman, "I began at the beginning", Linacre Quarterly (1993), 60:86-92; A.A. Howsepian, "Who or what are we?", Review of Metaphysics (March 1992), 45:483-502; S. Heaney, "Aquinas and the presence of the human rational soul in the early human embryo", The Thomist (Jan. 1992), 56(1):19-48; Stephen Schwarz, The Moral Question of Abortion (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1990), esp. Chapters 6 and 7; S Schwarz and R.K. Tacelli, "Abortion and some philosophers: A critical examination", Public Policy Quarterly (1989), 3:81-98; T. Iglesias, "In vitro fertilization: The major issues", Journal of Medical Ethics (1984), 10:32-37; J. Santamaria, "In vitro fertilization and embryo transfer", in M.N Brumsky, (ed.), Proceedings of the Conference: In Vitro Fertilization: Problems and Possibilities (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Center for Human Bioethics, Clayton, Vic., 1982), 48-53. Science/Philosophy/Theology: Mark Johnson, "Quaestio Disputata: Delayed Hominization; Reflections on some recent Catholic claims for delayed hominization", Theological Studies (1995), 56:743-763; B. Ashley and A. Moraczewski, "Is the biological subject of human rights present from conception?", in P. Cataldo and A. Moraczewski, The Fetal Tissue Issue: Medical and Ethical Aspects (Braintree, MA: The Pope John Center, 1994), Chapter Three; B. Ashley and K. O'Rourke, Ethics of Health Care (2nd ed.)(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 149-151; B. Ashley, "Delayed hominization: Catholic theological perspectives", in R.E. Smith (ed.), The Interaction of Catholic Bioethics and Secular Society (Braintree, MA: The Pope John Center, 1992), esp. 165, 176; A. Regan, "The human conceptus and personhood", Studia Moralis (1992), 30:97-127; W.E. May, "Zygotes, embryos and persons", Ethics and Medics, Part I (Oct. 1991), 16:10; G. Grisez, "When do people begin?", Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (1990), 63:27-47; T.J. O'Donnell, "A traditional Catholic's view", in P.B. Jung and T. Shannon, Abortion & Catholicism (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1998), 44-47; Benedict Ashley and Kevin O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics: A Theological Analysis (2nd ed.)(St. Louis, MO: Catholic Health Association, 1987), 2-6, 218-233; Jean de Siebenthal, "L'animation selon Thomas d'Aquin: Peut-on affirmer qui l'embryon est d'abord autre chose qu'un homme en s'appuyant sur Thomas d'Aquin?", in L'Embryon: Un Homme: Actes du Congres de Lausanne 1986 (Lausanne: Societe suisse de bioethique, 1986), 91-98; M.A. Taylor, Human Generation in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas: A Case Study on the Role of Biological Fact in Theological Science (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1982); Benedict Ashley, "A critique of the theory of delayed hominization", in D.G. McCarthy and A.S. Moraczewski, (eds.), An Ethical Evaluation of Fetal Experimentation: An Interdisciplinary Study (St. Louis, MO: Pope John Center, 1976), 113-133; G.C. Grisez, Abortion: The Myths, the Realities and the Arguments (New York: Corpus Books, 1970). International documents: Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation [Donum Vitae]", reprinted in L'Osservatore Romano (Vatican City: 16 March, 1987), 3; Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Select Committee on the Human Embryo Experimentation Bill 1985, (Official Hansard Report), (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1986), 25; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, "On the use of human embryos and foetuses for diagnostic, therapeutic, scientific, industrial and commercial purposes", Recommendation 1046 (1986), 1.

[iii]. C. Bedate and R. Cefalo, "The zygote: to be or not be a person", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1989), 14(6):641. Also J.T. Bole, "Metaphysical accounts of the zygote as a person and the veto power of facts", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1989), 14:647-653, and "Zygotes, souls, substances and persons", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1990), 15:637-652.

[iv]. C. Grobstein, The early development of human embryos", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1985), 10:213-236. Also R. McCormick, "Who or what is the preembryo?", Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, (1991), 1:1-15.

[v]. See D.N. Irving, "Individual testimony before the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel - March 14, 1994", reprinted in Linacre Quarterly (Nov. 1994), 61(4):82-89; D.N. Irving, "Embryo research: A call for closer scrutiny", Linacre Quarterly (July 17, 1994); also, D.N. Irving, "NIH Human Embryo Research Panel revisited: What is wrong with this picture?", Linacre Quarterly (May 2000).

[vi]. N. Ford, When Did I Begin? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 137, 156.

[vii]. D.G. Jones, "Brain birth and personal identity", Journal of Medical Ethics (1989), 15:4:173-178; D. MacKay, in Jones 1989; Rahner, Ruff and Haring, in Jones 1989; H. M. Sass, "Brain death and brain life: A proposal for normative agreement", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1989), 14:45-59; Singer and Wells, in Jones 1989; C. Tauer, "Personhood and human embryos and fetuses", Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1985), 10:253-266; M. Lockwood, "Warnock versus Powell (and Harradine): When does potentiality count?", Bioethics (1988), 3:187-213; J. Goldenring, "Development of the fetal brain", New England Journal of Medicine (1982), 307:564, and "The brain-life theory: Towards a consistent biological definition of humanness", Journal of Medical Ethics (1985), 11:198-120; T. Kushner, "Having a life versus being alive", Journal of Medical Ethics (1984), 10:5-8; Gertler, in P. Singer, Practical Ethics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981); M.V. Bennett, "Personhood from a neuroscientific perspective", in Doerr et al, Abortion Rights and Fetal "Personhood", (Long Beach: Cresline Press,1989).

[viii]. K.L. Moore, The Developing Human, (Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders Co., 1982). 14; B. Lewin (ed.), Genes III (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), 9-13, 386-394, 401; A.E.H. Emery, Elements of Medical Genetics, (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1983), 19, 93; also obvious from the following research: K. Gordon, et al., "Production of human tissue plasminogen activator in transgenic mouse milk", Bio Technology (1987), 5:1183: T. Weishous, et al., "Secretion of enzymatically active human renin from mammalian cells using an avian retroviral vector", Genes (1986). 45:2:121-129; A. Tanaka and D. Fujita, "Expression of a molecularly cloned human C-SRC oncogene by using a replication-competent retroviral vector", Molecular and Cellular Biology (1986), 6:11:3900-3909; A. Schnieke, et al., "Introduction of the human pro alpha 1 (I) collagen gene into pro alpha 1 (I) - deficient Mov-13 mouse cells leads to formation of functional mouse-human hybrid type I collagen", Proceedings of the National Academy of Science - USA (Feb. 1987), 84:3:764-768; C. Hart C, A. Awgulewitch, et al., "Homeobox gene complex on mouse chromosome II: Molecular cloning, expression in embryogenesis, and homology to a human homeobox locus", Cell (1985), 43:1:9-18; G. Kollias, et al., "The human beta-globulin gene contains a downstream developmental specific enhancer", Nucleic Acids Research (July 1987), 15:14:5739-47; B. Olofsson, V. Pizon, et al., "Structure and expression of the chicken epidermal growth factor receptor gene locus", European Journal of Biochemistry (1986), 160:2:261-266; L. Saez, S. Leinwand, "Characterization of diverse forms of myosin light chain gene: Unexpected interspecies homology with repetitive DNA", Archives of Biochemistry and Biophysics (1984), 233:2:565-572; R. Olle, et al., "Structural relation among mouse and human immunoglobulin VH genes in the subgroup III", Nucleic Acids Research (1983), 11:22:7887-97; N. Proudfoot, et al., "The structure of the human zeta-globin gene and a closely linked, nearly identical pseudogene", Cell (1982), 31:32:553-563.

[ix]. Bruce M. Carlson, Human Embryology and Developmental Biology (St. Louis, MO: Mosby, 1994), p. 31.

[x]. William Larsen, Human Embryology (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1997), 17; Bruce Carlson, Human Embryology and Developmental Biology (St. Louis, MO: Mosby, 1994), 33.

[xi]. Kollias (1987), note 8, supra; L. Covarrubias, et al., "Cellular DNA rearrangements and early developmental arrest caused by DNA insertion in transgenic mouse embryos", Molecular and Cellular Biology (1987), 7(6):2243-2247; R.K. Humphries, et al., "Transfer of human and murine globin-gene sequences into transgenic mice", American Journal of Human Genetics (1985), 37:2:295-310; J. Khillan, et al., "Tissue-specific, inducible and functional expression of the Ead MHC class II gene in transgenic mice", EMBO Journal (1985), 4(9):2225-30; R. Palmiter, et al., "Cell lineage ablation in transgenic mice by cell-specific expression of a toxin gene", Cell (1985). 43:1:9-18.

[xii]. K. Moore, The Developing Human (Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders, Co., 1982), 14; B. Lewin, Genes III (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987), 9-13, 202-203, 681; A.E.H. Emery, Elements of Medical Genetics (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1983), 93; J. Lejeune, in Martin Palmer (ed.), A Symphony of the Preborn Child: Part Two (Hagerstown, MD: NAAPC, 1989), 9-10, 16-19, 30.

[xiii]. B. Lewin, Genes III (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987), 11-13, 202-203, 681; A.E.H. Emery, Elements of Medical Genetics (New York: Churchill-Livingstone, 1983), 93.

[xiv]. That differentiation is not caused by the mother and is determined by the embryo: H. Holtzer, et al., "Induction-dependent and lineage-dependent models for cell-diversification are mutually exclusive", Progress in Clinical Biological Research, (1985), 175:3-11; F. Mavilio, A. Sineone, et al., "Differential and stage-related expression in embryonic tissues of a new human homeobox gene, Nature (1986), 324:6098:664-668; C. Hart, et al. (1985), note 8 supra.

[xv]. Ronan O'Rahilly and Fabiola Muller, Human Embryology & Teratology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994), p. 23.

[xvi]. A.E. Szulmann and U. Surti, "The syndromes of hydatidiform mole. I. Cytogenic and morphologic correlations", American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology (1978), 131:665-671; K. Moore, The Developing Human (3rd ed.)(Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders Co., 1982), 30; J. Lejeune, in Martin Palmer (ed.), A Symphony of the Preborn Child: Part Two (Hagerstown, MD: NAAPC, 1989), 19-19; M.S.E. Wimmers, et al., "Chromosome studies on early human embryos fertilized in vitro", Human Reproduction (1988), 7:894-900; S.D. Lawler and R.A. Fisher, "Genetic studies in hydatidiform mole with clinical correlations", Placenta (1987), 8:77-88; G.R. Martin, "Teratocarcinomas and mammalian embryogenesis", Science (1980), 209:768-776; Alberts, et al., Molecular Biology of the Cell (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983).

[xvii]. Ronan O'Rahilly and Fabiola Muller, Human Embryology & Teratology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994), p. 51; William J. Larsen, Human Embryology (New York, Churchill Livingston, 1997), p. 19; Keith Moore, The Developing Human (3rd ed.) (Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders Co., 1982), pp. 33, 62-63, 111, 127; K. Chauda et al, "An embryonic pattern of expression of a human fetal globin gene in transgenic mice", Nature (1986), 319:6055:685-689; G. Migliaccio et al., "Human embryonic hemopoiesis. Kinetics of progenitors and precursor underlying the yolk sac-liver transition", Journal of Clinical Investigation (1986), 78:1:51-60.

[xviii]. Ronan O'Rahilly and Fabiola Muller, Human Embryology & Teratology (New York: John Wiley & sons, Inc., 1994), p. 32; Keith Moore, The Developing Human (3rd ed.) (Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders Co., 1982), p. 133; K. Dawson, in Peter Singer et al., Embryo Experimentation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 43-52.

[xix]. Ronan O'Rahilly and Fabiola Muller, Human Embryology and Teratology (New York: John Wiley & sons, 1994), ftnt. p. 55.

[xx]. See D.N. Irving, "Individual testimony before the N.I.H. Human Embryo Research Panel", and "N.I.H. and human embryo research revisited: What is wrong with this picture?", note 2 supra, both republished with permission in the 2nd edition of our book : W.C. Kisher and D.N. Irving, The Human Development Hoax: Time To Tell The Truth!" - copies of which I submitted to this Committee. See also, W.C. Kischer, "In defense of human development", Linacre Quarterly (1992), 59:68-75; Kischer, "Human development and reconsideration of ensoulment", Linacre Quarterly (1993), 60:57-63; Kischer, "A New Wave Dialectic: The reinvention of human embryology", Linacre Quarterly, (1994), 61:66-81; Kischer, "A commentary on the beginning of life: A view from human embryology", Linacre Quarterly (1996), 63:78-88; Kischer, "The big lie in human embryology: The case of the preembryo", Linacre Quarterly (in press).

[xxi]. E.g., see Bruce M. Carlson, Human Embryology and Developmental Biology (St. Louis, MO: Mosby, 1994), p. 3.

[xxii]. Code of Federal Regulations 45CFR46, OPRR Reports, "Protection of Human Subjects". Department of Health and Human Services. National Institutes of Health, Office for Protection From Research Risks, 1983 (revised 1989, 1991), p. 12.

[xxiii]. See, e.g., Ronan O'Rahilly and Fabiola Muller, Human Embryology & Teratology (New York: Wiley-Liss, 1994, p. 55; Bruce M. Carlson, Human Embryology and Developmental Biology (St. Louis, MO: Mosby, 1994), p. 407.

[xxiv]. See D.N. Irving, "New Age human embryology text books ...", Linacre Quarterly (May 1994), 61(2):42-62, submitted to this Committee, in which it is demonstrated that in his 5th edition, Moore virtually incorrectly redefines many of the major human embryology terms.

[xxv].. See transcripts and video of the Fidea Ethics in Research Conference, Georgetown University, April 1991, including his answers to my questions to him.

[xxvi]. Jones 1989:15;4;173-178.

[xxvii]. K. Moore, The Developing Human (Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders, Co., 1982), 1.

[xxviii]. Jones 1989:173-178; T. Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) 111.

[xxix]. See extensive philosophical references in note 2, supra.

[xxx]. Since I only had 24 hours in which to prepare this testimony for the scientific panel, I have focused primarily on the science and scientific references. However, please see the references in note 2, supra, and several of the other notes, for extensive philosophical references.

[xxxi]. Peter Singer, "Taking life: Abortion", in Practical Ethics, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 118.

[xxxii]. Richard G. Frey, "The ethics of the search for benefits: Animal experimentation in medicine", in Raanan Gillon (ed.), Principles of Health Care Ethics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), pp. 1067-1075.